How I Ended Up Building Stealth Browser
My team and I did not plan to build a browser. For us, it was a huge step. It all began when we kept seeing wallets get drained even when users were not doing anything obviously wrong.
No phishing links, no fake websites, clean machines, and still compromised. I was interested, so we decided to look deeper.
The issue was not in the wallet itself. A lot of users in Web3 run high-value transactions inside default consumer browsers that were never designed for such conditions. Those browsers allow any extensions, DLL injection (even though Chromium is trying to fight it), and other attack vectors.
We realized something simple: as long as crypto runs inside a general-purpose browser, it will always be exposed.
You can add more wallet features, more UX alerts, but none of that changes the execution layer.
Instead of creating another extension, we decided to control the environment.
That is how Stealth Browser started. We built it with kernel-level protection (Ring 0) and a driver-based architecture. We removed all possibilities of DLL injection, restricted Chromium APIs so cookies and sensitive data cannot be exported, implemented real-time memory integrity with hash verification, and instant detection of compromised modules.
It was not about adding features, it was about eliminating an entire class of attack surface.